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Trial Practice and Procedure
John O’Shea Sullivan*
Leesa M. Guarnotta**
I. INTRODUCTION
The 2021 Survey period yielded decisions involving issues of first
impression relating to federal trial practice and procedure in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. This Article analyzes
recent trial practice developments in the Eleventh Circuit, including
significant rulings in the areas of consumer debt collections, removal,
jurisdiction and abstention, arbitration, and sanctions.1
II. LIABILITY UNDER THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
In a potentially dangerous ruling that the Eleventh Circuit
acknowledged “runs the risk of upsetting the status quo in the debtcollection industry[,]”2 the court held that a debt collector’s transmittal
of a consumer’s personal information to its “dunning vendor”
constituted a communication that violates section 1692c(b)3 of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).4 The facts in Hunstein v.
Preferred Collection are common and routine in the consumer debt
collection industry: a debt collector electronically sent data about a
consumer’s debt, including his name, outstanding balance, the fact that
*
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1. For analysis of last year’s trial practice and procedure during the Survey period,
see John O’Shea Sullivan & Kevin R. Stone, Trial Practice and Procedure, Eleventh
Circuit Survey, 72 MERCER L. REV. 1239 (2021).
2. Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 994 F.3d 1341, 1352 (11th
Cir. 2021), vacated, 17 F.4th 1103 (11th Cir. 2021).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) (1977).
4. Hunstein, 994 F.3d at 1352.
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the debt arose from his son’s medical treatment, and his son’s name, to
the debt collector’s own third-party vendor hired to create and mail a
dunning letter to the consumer.5 When the consumer sued alleging
violations of provisions of the FDCPA that prohibit debt collectors from
communicating consumers’ personal information to third parties “in
connection with the collection of any debt,”6 the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida rejected this reading of the
FDCPA and dismissed the case.7
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit had to consider, as a threshold
matter, whether a violation of section 1692c(b) of the FDCPA gives rise
to a concrete injury in fact under Article III,8 and on the merits,
whether the debt collector’s communications with its vendor was “in
connection with the collection of any debt.”9 The court decided both
questions in the affirmative, reversed the dismissal of the case, and
remanded to the district court.10
After finding that Hunstein alleged facts to constitute a concrete
injury, the court had to decide whether the debt collector’s
communications with its own vendor constituted a communication “in
connection with the collection of any debt.”11 The FDCPA generally
prohibits a debt collector’s communications, in connection with the
collection of any debt, with anyone other than the consumer, with
several exceptions.12 The debt collector in this case, Preferred
Collection, sent Hunstein’s personal information to Preferred
Collection’s dunning vendor, Compumail. The parties agreed that
Preferred Collection was a debt collector, that Hunstein was a
consumer, and that the transmittal of Hunstein’s personal information
to Compumail constituted a “communication” under the FDCPA.13
Thus, the sole question for the court was whether the communication
with Compumail was “in connection with the collection of any debt”
5. Id. at 1344.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b).
7. Hunstein, 994 F.3d at 1344–45.
8. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The analysis of whether there was a concrete injury
in fact under Article III was a question of the plaintiff’s standing and necessary for the
court to satisfy itself that it had subject matter jurisdiction. After a long discussion of the
Article III considerations for a finding of standing, the court concluded that Congress
intended that violations of § 1692c(b) constitute a concrete injury which confers standing
on aggrieved consumers. Hunstein, 994 F.3d at 1345–49.
9. Hunstein, 994 F.3d at 1344–45.
10. Id. at 1352.
11. Id. at 1344–45.
12. Id. at 1349 (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b)).
13. Id. at 1349; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) (2010) (defining “communication”).
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such that it violated section 1692c(b).14 Hunstein focused on the plain
meaning of the phrase to argue it was. Preferred Collection argued that
the court should adopt a factor-based analysis that shows that the
communication with Compumail was not in connection with the
collection of any debt.15
After quickly finding under the plain meaning of the words that
Preferred Collection’s communications with Compumail were made “in
connection with the collection of any debt,” the court turned to
Preferred Collection’s arguments based on various factors and case law
construing various other provisions of the FDCPA.16 Preferred
Collection’s first argument was that “in connection with the collection of
any debt” entailed a demand for payment, based on the court’s
interpretation of the same phrase in section 1692e17 of the FDCPA in
other cases.18 The court rejected this reasoning based on a review of the
exceptions in section 1692c(b), most of which the court found would
never involve a demand for payment,19 and the court’s finding that
Preferred Collection’s reading would render another portion of section
1692c(b) meaningless.20 The court found that by requiring a demand for
payment, the phrase “in connection with the collection of any debt”
would instead mean “to collect any debt.”21 While communications
under section 1692e might always involve demands for payment, since
that statute applies to communications received by debtors from debt
collectors, the broader situation addressed by section 1692c(b) does not
always involve communications to the debtor.22
The court then discussed Preferred Collection’s argument that the
Eleventh Circuit should adopt the multifactor balancing test23 that was
discussed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in

14. Hunstein, 994 F.3d at 1344–45.
15. Id. at 1349.
16. Id. at 1349–52.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (1996).
18. Hunstein, 994 F.3d at 1350–51 (first discussing Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree
& Adams, LLP, 678 F.3d 1211, 1217 (11th Cir. 2012); and then discussing Carceras v.
McCalla Raymer, LLC, 755 F.3d 1299, 1301–03 (11th Cir. 2014)).
19. The court found that a communication with a consumer reporting agency, the
creditor, the attorney for the creditor, and the attorney for the debt collector, all of which
are excepted from section 1692c(b), would never involve a demand for payment thereby
undermining Preferred Collection’s argument. Id. at 1350.
20. Id. at 1351–52.
21. Id. at 1351.
22. Id. at 1350.
23. Hunstein, 994 F.3d at 1351.
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an unpublished opinion in Goodson v. Bank of America, N.A.24 The
Goodson case involved an analysis of section 1692e, not section
1692c(b), and announced seven factors to take into account in analyzing
the “in connection with the collection of any debt” language in section
1692e, as follows:
(1) the nature of the relationship of the parties; (2) whether the
communication expressly demanded payment or stated a balance
due; (3) whether it was sent in response to an inquiry or request by
the debtor; (4) whether the statements were part of a strategy to
make payment more likely; (5) whether the communication was from
a debt collector; (6) whether it stated that it was an attempt to collect
a debt; and (7) whether it threatened consequences should the debtor
fail to pay.25

The court declined to adopt the balancing test in Goodson for two
reasons.26 First, Goodson was decided under section 1692e which the
court already distinguished from any analysis under section 1692c(b),
and which it found the Goodson test illustrates.27 Second, the court
found that the phrase “in connection with the collection of any debt” in
the context of section 1692c(b) “has a discernible ordinary meaning that
obviates the need for resort to extratextual ‘factors.’”28 The court held
that “[p]arties to FDCPA-governed transactions . . . are entitled to
guidance about the scope of permissible activity. They are likelier to get
it even from broadly framed statutory language than from a judge-made
gestalt.”29
The decision in Hunstein has been met with alarm and protest in the
financial services industry. As the court noted, the opinion suddenly
turns the routine practices of debt collectors in the ordinary course of
business for years into a violation of federal law requiring substantial
changes in the way they do business, and at great cost, for a benefit to
the consumer that the court admits would not amount to much.30 The
opinion was vacated and the case remains in the Eleventh Circuit on an
en banc rehearing, where the docket reflects multiple amici curiae

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

600 F. App’x. 422 (6th Cir. 2015).
Hunstein, 994 F.3d at 1351 (quoting Goodson, 600 F. App’x. at 431).
Id. at 1351.
Id. at 1351–52.
Id. at 1352.
Id.
Id. at 1350.
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briefs and oral argument held on February 22, 2022.31 The court’s
decision may very well be modified in 2022, but for now, debt collectors
engaged in activities in the Eleventh Circuit must be cautious not to
violate the FDCPA by sharing consumer information with their
vendors.32
III. FEDERAL JURISDICTION
It is a longstanding principle that all courts must always ensure that
they have subject matter jurisdiction.33 In 2021, the Eleventh Circuit
narrowed the scope of cases with subject matter jurisdiction under the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA)34 and on the basis of abstention
under the Declaratory Judgments Act35 and Burford abstention. The
court also limited the scope of some cases that might have otherwise
been remanded after removal.
A. Limits on Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under the APA
In Hakki v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs,36 the Eleventh
Circuit held that under the APA and the Veterans’ Benefits Act
(VBA),37 federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review the
decisions of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to terminate
employees.38
After more than twenty years as a VA urologist, plaintiff Said I.
Hakki (Dr. Hakki) made several requests for leave without pay to allow
him to assist the Department of Defense in developing government and
healthcare systems in Iraq as a part of the Iraqi Red Crescent.39 In Dr.
Hakki’s fifth year of leave, the VA learned that Dr. Hakki was no longer
31. Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 17 F.4th 1103, 1104 (11th
Cir. 2021).
32. The authors, who were not involved in the litigation in any way, wonder why
Compumail, as Preferred Collection’s vendor, was not considered Preferred Collection’s
agent for purposes of receiving the communications about the consumer. It seems that a
debt collector communicating with its own agent would not be a communication at all
since the agent may be fairly considered as merely an extension of the debt collector itself,
the same as if Compumail was one of Preferred Collection’s employees working on the file.
33. Cf. Mallory & Evans Contractors. & Eng’rs, LLC v. Tuskegee Univ., 663 F.3d
1304 (11th Cir. 2011).
34. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2011).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2020); 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1948).
36. 7 F.4th 1012 (11th Cir. 2021).
37. 38 U.S.C. § 7461 (2017).
38. Hakki, 7 F.4th at 1016. The Eleventh Circuit also addressed the plaintiff’s due
process claims and mandamus claims which are not addressed here.
39. Id. at 1016–17.

1338

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73

assisting in Iraq and notified him that he was expected to return to
work. Dr. Hakki was twice granted extensions in response to his
grievances that claimed he needed to remain in Iraq to refute false
criminal charges. But the VA denied Dr. Hakki’s third grievance, which
was on the same grounds, because there was no “certainty regarding
the date of [Dr. Hakki’s] return” or VA interest as required by the VA
handbook.40
On the last day of his approved leave, Dr. Hakki responded that his
grievance provided a return date of July 1, 2009 and filed a union
grievance challenging the denial.41 Dr. Hakki did not appear at the VA
and was considered absent without leave (AWOL), which continued
when the VA denied Dr. Hakki’s union grievance. The union requested
arbitration of the grievance denial. Although the VA proposed a
settlement, Dr. Hakki rejected it and filed an unfair labor practice
charge with the Federal Labor Relations Authority, which did not issue
a complaint. Dr. Hakki also filed a new request for leave, to which the
VA did not respond.42
Dr. Hakki did not return to the VA during his challenges, so the VA
proposed discharge for being AWOL for twenty-six weeks.43 Dr. Hakki
challenged the proposal with the appointed Human Resources advisor,
who recommended upholding the discharge because of the frequency of
Dr. Hakki’s absences without leave. Dr. Hakki challenged this decision
to the Veterans Integrated Service Networks Region 18 Network
Director, who recommended denial to the VA Deputy. Dr. Hakki then
sought review of his discharge from the VA in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida under the APA and the
Mandamus Act, based on alleged violations of his due process. The
district court remanded the case to the VA to require an opportunity for
cross-examination as mandated by VA procedure. The VA ultimately
upheld the discharge.44 Dr. Hakki’s claims in the lawsuit argued that
“the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion, and
otherwise not in accordance with law.”45 The district court granted the
VA’s motion for summary judgment based on lack of jurisdiction under
the APA because the VBA is the exclusive remedy for disciplined VA
employees.46
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id. at 1018.
Id.
Id. at 1019.
Id. at 1019–21.
Id. at 1024.
Id. at 1022.
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On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit first noted that the court’s
evaluation should be on a “factual attack” standard under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)47 instead of summary judgment.48 A factual
attack allows consideration of extrinsic evidence even at the pleadings
stage.49 In evaluating jurisdiction, the court compared50 the VBA to the
Supreme Court of the United States’ treatment of the Civil Service
Reform Act (CSRA) in United States v. Fausto.51 In Fausto, the Court
held that the CSRA precluded APA review of non-preference excepted
employees because of a deliberate exclusion in the comprehensive
system for reviewing personnel action against federal employees based
on the act’s purpose, text, and structure of review.52 The Eleventh
Circuit also analyzed its decision in Lee v. Hughes53 where it held that
the VBA evidenced “a congressional intent to preclude certain VA
employees from recovering pursuant to a Bivens action for damages.”54
The Eleventh Circuit then reasoned that the VBA provides a
comprehensive scheme of four statutory sections governing VA
employee discipline, including two grievance processes for VA
employees.55 Because Dr. Hakki’s termination did not involve
professional conduct or competence, his review process was guided by
section 7463 of the United States Code,56 which is silent on any issues
other than: (1) the right to representation, (2) the right to formal review
by an impartial VA agent, (3) the right to a prompt report of findings
and recommendations, and (4) the right to prompt review by a higherlevel VA official.57 Whereas the separate review process for actions
involving professional conduct and competence expressly provides for
judicial review, reviews of actions of mixed questions of professional
conduct/non-professional conduct are expressly entitled to review by the
Disciplinary Appeals Board.58
The court rejected the APA as an alternate ground for judicial
review.59 This is because both the APA and VBA allow review for
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
Hakki, 7 F.4th at 1022–23.
Id. at 1023.
Id. at 1024.
484 U.S. 439 (1988).
Id. at 1275.
145 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 1998).
Hakki, 7 F.4th at 1024.
Id. at 1024–25.
38 U.S.C. § 7463 (2018).
Hakki, 7 F.4th at 1027.
Id.
Id. at 1029.
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decisions that are arbitrary, capricious, and involve an abuse of
discretion, or are otherwise not in accordance with law.60 The court
reasoned that, due to the overlap in reasons for review, allowing for
APA review here “would ‘turn’ the VBA’s disciplinary structure of
review ‘upside down’” and would “thwart the will of Congress.”61
Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal.62
B. District Court Authority to Decline Cases
1. Remanding Cases After Removal Based on Diversity
Jurisdiction
In Shipley v. Helping Hands Therapy,63 the Eleventh Circuit decided
an issue of first impression: “whether a district court has authority to
remand a case based on a procedural defect in removal when (1) a
motion to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is filed within
[thirty] days of the notice of removal, but (2)” the motion to remand fails
to raise the issue of a procedural defect until a reply brief filed after the
thirty-day statutory time limit.64 The court held that the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Alabama exceeded its
authority in remanding in these circumstances because the procedural
defect was not raised until fifty-four days after the removal.65
The Shipley action was filed in Alabama state court alleging injuries
suffered during physical therapy sessions conducted at the defendants’
office.66 The defendants removed the action to the district court 364
days after the filing of the case in state court.67 Shipley timely moved to
remand, within thirty days of the removal, arguing there was no subject
matter jurisdiction because the parties lacked complete diversity of
citizenship, but she did not argue that there was any procedural defect
in the removal.68 After the defendants responded to the motion to
remand, Shipley filed a reply brief fifty-four days after the removal
where she argued for the first time that the removal had a procedural

60. Id. at 1028.
61. Id. at 1028–29.
62. Id. at 1038.
63. 996 F.3d 1157 (11th Cir. 2021).
64. Id. at 1158.
65. Id. at 1160.
66. Id. at 1158.
67. The opinion did not shed any light on why the defendants waited to remove the
case until one day shy of the one-year anniversary of the filing of the lawsuit.
68. Id. at 1158 n.1. The appellate court noted here that it was clearly established that
there was indeed complete diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
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defect—the defendants failed to remove within the statutory timeframe.
The district court granted the motion to remand finding that the
removal was defective.69
The question on appeal was whether the defendants’ objection to the
removal, on procedural grounds based on timeliness, was valid when
first asserted fifty-four days after the removal although the defendant
had timely moved to remand within thirty days of the removal.70 The
Eleventh Circuit first noted that other circuits are split on the issue,
with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit finding
remand permissible, while the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit has held that remand is improper under these
circumstances.71 The court then turned to the plain text of the pertinent
statute, section 1447(c) of the United States Code,72 and found that the
language of the statute requires a remand order under section 1447(c)
must be “‘openly based’ on (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or (2)
‘a motion to remand the case filed within [thirty] days of the notice of
removal which is based upon a defect in the removal procedure.’”73
The court held that Shipley’s remand motion was timely but based on
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, not a procedural defect.74 Shipley’s
reply brief, filed more than thirty days after the notice of removal,
raised a procedural defect (timeliness of the removal), but the
procedural defect argument was raised fifty-four days after removal and
was outside the thirty-day timeframe set in the statute.75 Because
Shipley’s motion to remand and reply brief were neither a motion to
remand on the basis of a defect other than subject matter jurisdiction
nor made within thirty days after the filing of the notice of removal, the
district court erred in remanding the case based on a procedural defect
not raised within thirty days of removal.76

69. Id. at 1158–59. The district court remanded the case by overruling the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation that the motion to remand be denied because
Shipley’s objection to the timeliness of the removal was itself untimely. Id. at 1159.
70. Id. at 1158.
71. Id. at 1159 (citing BEPCO, L.P. v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 675 F.3d 466, 471 (5th
Cir. 2012); and then Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines
Steel Co., 69 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 1995)).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2011).
73. Shipley, 996 F.3d at 1160 (quoting In re Bethesda Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 123 F.3d
1407, 1409 (11th Cir. 1997)).
74. Id. at 1160.
75. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)).
76. Id. (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996)).
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2. Declining Declaratory Judgment Actions
In National Trust Insurance Company v. Southern Heating and
Cooling, Inc.,77 the Eleventh Circuit, as a matter of first impression,
held, inter alia, that (1) the existence of parallel state court proceedings
is not required for a district court to refuse a declaratory judgment
action, and (2) the similarity between concurrent state court
proceedings and a federal declaratory judgment action is not a
threshold factor for a district court to refuse to hear a declaratory
judgment action.78 In National Trust, the plaintiff, Hodge, sued
Southern Heating and Cooling, Inc. (Southern Heating) in Alabama
state court following his parents’ death from carbon monoxide
poisoning. National Trust, Southern Heating’s commercial liability
insurer, filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court arguing it
had no duty to defend or indemnify Southern Heating in the state court
action. Hodge and Southern Heating sought to dismiss the declaratory
judgment action because the issue whether carbon monoxide is a
pollutant (and excluded under the policy) was unresolved under state
law and required a factual determination. The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama declined to exercise
jurisdiction and dismissed the action without prejudice because (1) the
Alabama state court action was parallel to the declaratory judgment
action, and (2) the factors for hearing a declaratory judgment action
weighed in favor of dismissal.79
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit enumerated the non-exclusive
factors for deciding whether to adjudicate, dismiss, or stay declaratory
judgment actions as follows: (1) State interest in deciding the issues; (2)
Whether the federal declaratory judgment will settle the controversy;
(3) Whether the federal action would be useful to clarifying the legal
relations at issue; (4) Whether the declaratory remedy merely provides
for federal jurisdiction or federal res judicata; (5) Whether the
declaratory judgment action would encroach on state jurisdiction or
otherwise increase tensions between state and federal authority; (6)
Whether an alternate remedy is more effective; (7) Whether the
underlying factual issues are important to an informed resolution of the
case; (8) Whether the state court is better positioned to evaluate factual
issues; and (9) Whether there is a close nexus between the factual and

77. 12 F.4th 1278 (11th Cir. 2021).
78. Id. at 1283.
79. Id. at 1281–82.
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legal issues and state law/public policy or whether federal law dictates
the declaratory judgment action.80
The Eleventh Circuit refused to create a bright-line rule requiring a
parallel state court proceeding as a prerequisite to the Ameritas
analysis.81 The court stated that nowhere in section 2201(a) is there a
mention of “parallel proceedings.”82 Further, although the Supreme
Court of the United States addressed parallel proceedings in other
actions dealing with a district court’s discretion under the Declaratory
Judgment Act, those references were based purely on the procedural
posture of those cases.83 The Supreme Court’s discussion of parallel
proceedings within the procedural context of specific cases is not the
creation of a new requirement for federal courts to retain declaratory
judgment actions.84
The Eleventh Circuit also refused to add the similarity of parallel
proceedings as a discrete factor for determining whether a district court
will hear a declaratory judgment action.85 Instead, the court reasoned
that the similarity between actions is already considered in the nine
existing Ameritas factors on the totality of the circumstances.86 The
court noted that to have a threshold parallel-proceeding factor, the
court would have to set a single definition of “parallel proceedings.”87
But the court reasoned that a framework based on a technical definition
of significant weight could preclude consideration of the degree of
similarity.88 Additionally, some state laws would always prevent a
parallel proceeding (such as Florida’s preclusion of actions directly
against insurers), which would essentially allow state law to supersede
district court discretion in determining its jurisdiction under the
Declaratory Judgment Act.89

80. Id. at 1282–83 (citing Ameritas Variable Life Ins. Co. v. Roach, 411 F.3d 1328,
1331 (11th Cir. 2005)).
81. Id. at 1283.
82. Id. at 1284.
83. Id.
84. “We do not attempt at this time to delineate the outer boundaries of that
discretion in other cases, for example, cases raising issues of federal law or cases in which
there are no parallel state proceedings.” Id. (quoting Wilton v. Seven Falls, 515 U.S. 277,
290 (1995)).
85. Id. at 1285.
86. Id. at 1285–86.
87. Id. at 1287.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1288.
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3. Declining Jurisdiction in Cases Involving State Policy
While National Trust expanded district courts’ authority to decline
cases otherwise within their jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion
in Deal v. Tugalo Gas Co.90 reinforces the limits of the district courts’
authority to utilize Burford abstention.91 Burford abstention permits a
court to decline to adjudicate a case otherwise within its jurisdiction
where the case involves issues of state policy.92 In Deal, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia invoked
Burford abstention to abstain from adjudicating the plaintiff’s judicialdissolution, accounting, and auditor-appointment claims.93 On appeal,
the Eleventh Circuit found the abstention improper.94 The court found
that Burford abstention permits a federal court to decline a case
otherwise under its jurisdiction in very narrow circumstances such as
the following: (1) difficult questions of state law regarding public policy
of substantial public import, which transcend the specific case; or (2)
federal review would disrupt state efforts to “establish a coherent
policy” of substantial public concern.95
The question whether a federal court may dissolve a state-chartered
corporation where there was no prior state action to dissolve the
corporation—as presented in Deal—did not satisfy these limited
circumstances.96 Accordingly, the case was remanded for the district
court to consider the issues on which the court had abstained.97
C. Appellate Jurisdiction
Public access to the courts, including judicial records, is “crucial to
[American] tradition and history [and] continued public confidence in
[the American justice system].”98 Nevertheless, trial courts across the
country, regardless of the subject matter of the case, are often forced to
balance the importance of public access with the privacy concerns of
individuals and businesses alike. The Eleventh Circuit evaluated the

90. 991 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2021).
91. Id.
92. Burford v. San Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 334 (1943).
93. Deal, 991 F.3d at 1326.
94. Id.
95. Id. (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491
U.S. 350, 361 (1989)).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1327.
98. Callahan v. United Network for Organ Sharing, 17 F.4th 1356, 1359 (11th Cir.
2021).
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timing for appellate review of such decisions in Callahan v. United
Network for Organ Sharing.99
Callahan involved the claims of several hospitals to enjoin the
development of a new liver allocation policy by the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) and the United Network for Organ
Sharing (UNOS).100 The documents at issue included emails with
personal opinions about the development of the new policy by UNOS’s
top-level personnel and policymakers. The United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia provisionally placed under seal the
briefing on the hospitals’ request for preliminary injunction, which
incorporated the documents, and the documents themselves, and
excluded those documents from the administrative record in a related
action involving a claim against HHS. After the trial court denied the
preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs moved to unseal the briefs and
documents. The trial court granted the motion and UNOS appealed.101
In evaluating whether the trial court abused its discretion in
unsealing the documents, the Eleventh Circuit first addressed its
subject matter jurisdiction.102 To appeal something other than a final
judgment that resolves all litigation on the merits, an appeal must
satisfy the collateral order doctrine.103 Under the doctrine, the decision
must: “(1) conclusively determine the disputed question, (2) resolve an
important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and
(3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”104
Ultimately, the court held, as a matter of first impression, that
orders unsealing documents—like orders granting motions to seal and
orders denying motions to unseal—are reviewable as collateral
orders.105 This is because “once information is revealed, it cannot be
made secret again.”106 Thus, if UNOS had to wait until full resolution of
the action, the documents would be allowed to enter public circulation
and appeal would be moot.107

99. Id. at 1360.
100. Id. at 1359.
101. Id. at 1359–60.
102. Id. at 1360.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1365.
106. Id. at 1361.
107. Id. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the trial court’s unsealing because the
documents were used in connection with merits briefing, making them judicial records
and because there was no compelling reason to keep the documents under seal. Id. at
1363–64.
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IV. LIMITING FEES ON COUNSEL
In Peer v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston,108 the Eleventh
Circuit, considering a matter split within its district courts, held the
fee-shifting provision in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA)109 does not permit attorney’s fees awards against counsel.110
In this ERISA action, the plaintiff filed several amended complaints
in violation of local rules, none of which cured a mooted action.111
Accordingly, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida dismissed the case and the appellate court affirmed. On
remand, the district court granted attorney’s fees against plaintiff’s
attorney, not plaintiff herself, pursuant to ERISA’s fee-shifting
provision. The court justified this allocation because had the attorney
acknowledged the moot claims and not left the court in a state of
“confusion,” the case would have ended sooner and with less waste of
resources.112 The plaintiff’s attorney appealed, arguing that the
plaintiff, not her counsel, should have paid the fees.113
The Eleventh Circuit agreed, vacated the award against the lawyer,
and remanded the matter to the district court.114 The Eleventh Circuit
evaluated several common law principles.115 First, it noted that courts
do not have “roving authority . . . to allow counsel fees . . . whenever the
courts might deem them warranted.”116 Instead, such authority must
come from Congressional mandate.117 In other words, where a statute—
like ERISA—“does not explicitly permit a fee award against counsel,”
the presumption is that such an award is not permitted.118
In addition to this common law principle, the court looked to
longstanding principles of the attorney-client relationship.119 The court
reasoned that allowing for such sanctions would cause friction in the
attorney-client relationship and would also conflict with “the
longstanding rule that clients are responsible for the actions of their

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

992 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2021).
29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (2014).
Peer, 992 F.3d at 1260.
Id. at 1261.
Id. at 1261–62.
Id. at 1262.
Id. at 1265.
Id. at 1262–63.
Id. at 1262 (alteration in original).
See id.
Id. at 1263.
Id. at 1264.
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lawyers, not the other way around.”120 The court also reasoned that
ERISA’s purpose is not to punish misconduct, but to protect employees
and their beneficiaries and to promote uniform administration of
employee benefit plans.121 Allowing sanctions against attorneys would
actually inhibit these goals because “[q]ualified attorneys might reject
ERISA cases . . . because of the heightened personal risk.”122 Beyond
these foundational principles, the court reasoned that the five-factor
test for ERISA attorney’s fees focus on the parties, not their
attorneys.123
Accordingly, the court held that courts must use the proper authority
for punishing attorney misconduct such as section 1927 of the United
States Code124 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c),125 and may not
use the ERISA fee-shifting provision as a shortcut.126
V. ARBITRATION
In Hearn v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC,127 the Eleventh
Circuit declined to address the permissible scope of an arbitration
agreement.128 Nevertheless, the court adopted an expansive
interpretation in favor of arbitration, further evidencing the breadth of
the preference in federal courts for arbitration.129
This putative class action against Comcast Cable Communications
LLC (Comcast) focused on the following language in a December 2016
Subscriber Agreement in which the putative class representative,
Michael Hearn (Hearn), agreed to arbitrate:
Any claim or controversy related to Comcast, including but not
limited to any and all: (1) claims for relief and theories of liability,
whether based in contract, tort, fraud, negligence, statute,
regulation, ordinance, or otherwise; (2) claims that arose before this
or any prior Agreement; (3) claims that arise after the expiration or
termination of this Agreement; and (4) claims that are currently the

120.
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subject of purported class action litigation in which you are not a
member of a certified class.130

Hearn terminated his Comcast services in April 2017.131
In March 2019, Hearn inquired into pricing and services at the same
address through a telephone call to Comcast.132 The parties disputed
whether this call was for new services or reconnected services. Not in
dispute is the fact that the Comcast representative on the call pulled
Hearn’s credit without his knowledge, which lowered Hearn’s credit
score. Thus, Hearn filed this action for violations of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act.133 Comcast moved to compel arbitration under the 2016
Subscriber Agreement.134 The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia denied the motion finding that Hearn’s
claim was outside of the 2016 Subscriber Agreement’s scope because the
suit arose out of new services instead of reconnected services. Comcast
then filed the present appeal.135
In reaching its decision, the Eleventh Circuit recounted the Federal
Arbitration Act’s (FAA)136 liberal policy in favor of arbitration and that
any doubts about scope should favor arbitration.137 Thus, the court has
upheld “arbitration agreement[s] [that] reach beyond the matters
addressed in the underlying contract.”138 The 2016 Subscriber
Agreement, however, is broader than any previous arbitration
agreement enforced by the Eleventh Circuit because it expressly applies
to all disputes between the parties even if the agreement was
terminated at the time the dispute arose.139 The court declined to
address whether such a broad provision is enforceable, reasoning,
instead, that Hearn’s claim related to the 2016 Subscriber
Agreement.140
The court based its decision on the fact that Comcast only had the
information it needed to conduct the credit check through its prior
relationship with Hearn.141 The court also noted the 2016 Subscriber
130.
131.
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133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
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Agreement’s specific provisions relating to credit inquiries, including a
provision that “[r]econnection of the Service(s) is subject to our credit
policies.”142 The court rejected Hearn’s argument that reconnection
under the 2016 Subscriber Agreement was limited to late or
non-payments.143 Regardless, the court reasoned, this exact situation
was anticipated by the 2016 Subscriber Agreement and the credit
provisions directly relate to Hearn’s claim.144 Accordingly, the court
reversed the district court’s decision and remanded for further
consideration.145
Although the Eleventh Circuit declined to reach the first impression
issue presented in Hearn, it did address the first impression arbitration
issue presented in McLaurin v. Terminix International Co.146 In
McLaurin, the court analyzed the plain language of the FAA, which
“explicitly authorizes a party to file a motion to confirm at any time
during the year immediately following an arbitration award.”147
Nevertheless, the FAA grants a district court “discretion” to stay such
confirmation.148 The Eleventh Circuit made clear that this discretion
does not create a mandatory stay of an arbitration for any length of
time or for any reason, regardless of whether the court has notice of a
losing party’s intent to challenge the award.149
VI. CONCLUSION
The 2021 Survey period yielded several decisions of first impression
and importance in the Eleventh Circuit. While the Survey is not
intended to be exhaustive, the Authors have attempted to provide
material that will be useful to practitioners by selecting relevant
updates in the area of federal trial practice and procedure in the
Eleventh Circuit.
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